This study examines whether the Japanese scheme of nontransferable water rights results in technical inefficiency. Using data on 1,263 Japanese retail water suppliers for 2008, their technical efficiency is measured employing data envelopment analysis. Next, a bootstrapped truncated regression model is specified to examine the determinants of technical efficiency. The estimation results reveal that the nontransferability of water rights leads to technical inefficiency of retail water suppliers. Furthermore, the costs of this efficiency amount to about 462 billion yen. This result suggests the government should reallocate water rights flexibly in order to ensure efficiency.
Nontransferable Water Rights and Technical
Inefficiency in the Japanese Water Supply Industry *
Introduction
Water rights, the rights of users to use water from a water resource, determine water allocation, sometimes resulting in overuse of land and suboptimal adoption of water conservation. Zilberman (1985, 1986) , for example, examine the choice of irrigation technologies in California and suggest that the adoption of inefficient technologies is caused by a water rights regime which prevents water from being allocated according to the marginal willingness to pay for water.
In Japan, water rights are not transferable across retail water suppliers.
The government sets strict guidelines on the daily and annual amounts of water that retail suppliers need to supply and regulates the purpose for which they can supply water. Moreover, the government prohibits water users with water rights from not exercising their water rights, rescinding water rights when they are not used. In addition, the government has not established a water trading scheme among retail water suppliers, so that suppliers cannot buy and sell water access entitlements. Furthermore, because of the difficulties of water resources development, suppliers rarely obtain new water rights. This rigid regime provides them with an incentive to retain water rights.
Studies suggest that this lack of transferable water rights likely results in considerable inefficiency. Rosegrant and Binswanger (1994) , as well as Fisher (1995) , applying the Coase theorem and focusing on developing countries, for example suggest that transferable water rights could improve efficiency and sustainability of water use. Other studies on the issue of water rights include those by Peterson et al. (2004) , who examine the benefits of water trade in Australia, and Grafton et al. (2011) , who compare the gains from water trade in Australia and the western United States. While these studies produce interesting results on the efficiency of water resource usage, none of these studies consider the 2 efficiency of water suppliers.
There are, however, a number of studies on the relationship between the regulatory scheme and the efficiency of water suppliers, but they do not allow the formulation of stylized facts. 1 The purpose of this study is to examine whether the Japanese regulatory scheme with nontransferable water rights causes technical inefficiency, based on the two-stage procedure proposed by Wilson (2000, 2007) . First, using data on 1,263 Japanese retail water suppliers for 2008, data envelopment analysis (DEA) is employed to obtain an index of technical efficiency. Second, a bootstrapped truncated regression model is specified in order to examine the determinants of the DEA efficiency index. The estimation reveals that the scheme of nontransferable rights leads to technical inefficiency of retail water suppliers. Furthermore, the costs of this inefficiency amount to about 462 billion yen when compared with a counterfactual scenario in which water rights are reallocated in order to raise the efficiency of the water supply industry.
This result suggests that the government should reallocate water rights flex-ibly in order to ensure efficiency. It could do so by allowing water suppliers to trade in water rights. The underlying rationale would be the Coase theorem, which states that bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of property rights. The reallocation of water rights through the introduction of a trading scheme could improve water suppliers' technical efficiency and achieve Pareto efficiency.
This paper is organized as follow. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the Japanese retail water supply industry. Section 3 then outlines the methodology used for the analysis, explaining how technical efficiency is measured using DEA and presenting the regression model to examine the determinants of efficiency.
Next, Section 4 describes the dataset and presents the estimation results, while Section 5 assesses the technical inefficiency caused by the nontransferable water rights scheme. Section 6 concludes.
Industry Background

Types of water utilities
Water suppliers provide their services for certain purposes. Figure suppliers and are not subject to the Local Public Enterprise Act. On the other hand, suppliers serving a population of more than 5,000 persons are subject to the Local Public Enterprise Act. This study focuses on retail water suppliers serving a population of more than 5,000 people, which are simply referred to as water suppliers hereafter.
Nontransferable water rights
Water supplies fundamentally rely upon water rights. Water rights are defined in the River Act as the rights of users to use water from a water resource owned and administered by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism or a prefectural government. The Ministry and prefectural governments administer surface water sources, including artificial lakes behind dams, rivers, intermittent streams, and lakes. However, groundwater is owned by the owner of the land under which the water is stored and not subject to the water rights granted by the government. 3 Figure 2 shows the distribution of withdrawals by type of source in Japan. Due to the mountainous topography of Japan, about half of the water for domestic use is from artificial lakes behind dams. About 80% of water for domestic use relies on water sources subject to water rights. Therefore, water rights have a serious influence on the stable supply of water.
However, the Japanese water rights regime provides little flexibility, encouraging water suppliers to retain water rights. The government strictly allocates water resources to set the annual total and daily usage for a predetermined purpose, assigning exclusive usage for 10 years. Although water rights are usually renewed, they can be rescinded if water suppliers do not exercise their water rights. 4 In addition, there is no water trading scheme enabling retail water suppliers to buy and sell water access entitlements. Furthermore, because of the difficulty of water resources development, water suppliers rarely obtain new water rights. This rigid regime provides suppliers with an incentive to retain water rights.
Vertical structure
Furthermore, this rigid water rights regime gives rise to vertical integration in the water utilities industry. Figure 3 provides a graphic representation of the three types of retail water suppliers that can be found in Japan: those with sufficient water rights, those with partial water rights, and those with no water rights. In 2008, 635 retail water suppliers fell into the first category with sufficient water rights to meet the demand they face. Such suppliers are vertically integrated, i.e., they extract and purify water and then supply this as drinkingwater to households. 261 retail water suppliers fell into the second category with insufficient water rights to meet the demand they face and, as a result, were partially vertically integrated. Similar to the first type of water suppliers, they extract and purify water and supply this as drinking-water to households.
In addition, however, they also need to purchase water from wholesale suppliers in order to meet the demand they face. Finally, there were 367 water suppliers with no water rights, meaning that they had to purchase water from wholesale water suppliers to supply individual households.
Other regulations: Prices and service areas
Both the prices water suppliers charge and the area they serve are regulated.
Water prices are stipulated by the Local Public Enterprise Act and are based on the full-cost pricing rule. 5 Furthermore, water prices are specified in an ordinance concerning water supply. If water suppliers want to change their 
Methodology
To examine whether the nontransferability of water rights results in technical inefficiency, a two-stage procedure is employed. In the first stage, water suppliers' technical efficiency is calculated by constructing a DEA efficiency index, while in the second stage, a bootstrapped truncated regression model is estimated to examine the determinants of the DEA efficiency index. 
Data envelopment analysis
The DEA method derives a piecewise linear production frontier conditional 
where y is the output vector, y i is the output of firm i, X is the input matrix,
x i is the input vector of firm i, and e is the unit vector. The solution of this linear-programming problem results in an index value of technical efficiency.
Regression analysis of the determinants of efficiency
The calculated efficiency index is regressed on water withdrawals associated with water rights, using the bootstrapped procedure proposed by Wilson (2000, 2007) . Thus, the following bootstrapped truncated regression model is 9 specified:
whereθ is the technical efficiency obtained from equation (1), Z is a vector of water withdrawals and other control variables, and ε ∼ N (0, σ 2 ) such that
Many studies estimating a model such as equation (2) Nikkei NEEDS was used to obtain information on the municipal area. In this study, the municipal area is used as the service area of a water supplier, because most water utilities are owned by municipalities, so that service areas typically are approximately equal to municipal areas.
A summary of the definitions of variables and their basic statistics is provided in Table 1 .
Estimation results: Data envelopment analysis
The DEA model in this study includes one output and five inputs. The output variable is defined as the logarithm of supplied water per year. As for input variables, the logarithm of tangible fixed assets, 7 the logarithm of the number of employees, the logarithm of water purchased per year, the logarithm of water withdrawals associated with water rights, and the ratio of annual average water distribution to peak water distribution (RAP ) are chosen. Since whether a water supplier has water rights or not determines whether it is vertically integrated, withdrawals associated with water rights are essential inputs. The ratio of annual average water distribution to peak water distribution is intended to 
Estimation results: Determinants of efficiency
To examine whether the Japanese regulatory scheme with nontransferable water rights causes technical inefficiency, the bootstrapped truncated regression is applied to separate external environmental influences from the net technical inefficiency caused by nontransferable water rights. Two types of inefficiency can be distinguished. The first type of inefficiency arises when water suppliers have sufficient water rights to meet demand but are slow to adopt new water conservation technologies. Since water rights strictly determine water withdrawals, the water supplier can be slow to adopt new water conservation technologies if the amount of water withdrawals per population served is relatively large. The second type of inefficiency arises due to excess capital when water suppliers have insufficient water rights to meet demand, meaning that even if they are near a water source, they need to purchase water from a wholesaler. This may result in an excessive water pipeline infrastructure. These two scenarios suggest that the relationship between technical inefficiency and water withdrawals is probably not a simple linear one.
The estimated specification is as follows:
whereθ is the DEA technical efficiency score, X is water withdrawals associated with water rights per population served, and X 2 is the squared value of this variable to capture any possible nonlinear relationship between technical efficiency and water withdrawals. Dens is the logarithm of the population density, while
Age is the number of years since the establishment of a water supplier and DCD is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if any deficits that a water supplier 13 0.8994 * * * 0.8981 * * * 0.9100 * * * (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0010) X 0.0175 * * * 0.0194 * * * 0.0214 * * * (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) incurs are covered by a local government and zero otherwise. Next, CRD is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if a water supplier's current liabilities exceed its current assets, and zero otherwise. Finally, IRD is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the redemption cost of the municipal bonds issued by a water supplier is less than the depreciation cost and zero otherwise. Since water suppliers generally issue municipal bonds to acquire fixed assets, IRD can be interpreted as representing the financial soundness of a water supplier.. preted as representing the degree of aging of the infrastructure and equipment of a supplier. However, the consolidation of municipalities in recent years has led to mergers among water suppliers, and the merger between an older and a newer water supplier may make Age meaningless. The three different specifications yield virtually identical results. The discussion below therefore focuses mainly on the results for specification (3.1).
Looking at the results, we find that the explanatory variables concerning nontransferable water rights, X and X 2 , are statistically significant at the 1% level. The sign on X is positive, while the sign on X 2 is negative, implying that the relationship between technical efficiency and water withdrawals associated with water rights is strictly concave. Furthermore, suppliers with relatively low technical efficiency as a result of nontransferable water rights can be distinguished based on the first-order condition:
On the one hand, there are water suppliers for which α 1 + 2α 2 X ≫ 0. These tend to be found in municipalities with lower-than-predicted population growth such as Osaka-City and Yubari-City (in Hokkaido). These municipalities have projected urban development based on their predicted population growth. Since their water suppliers have quite a strong incentive to keep their water rights, they have less incentive to adopt new water conservation technologies. On the other hand, there are water suppliers for which α 1 + 2α 2 X ≪ 0. These tend to be found in relatively new municipalities such as Kadoma-City (in Osaka) and Sanda-City (in Hyogo). These municipalities have insufficient water rights to meet demand and purchase water from a wholesaler even if they are close to sources of drinking water. In order to purchase water from a wholesaler, these municipalities lay water pipes to a wholesaler. These water pipes to a wholesaler can be considered to be excessive infrastructure. The results thus support the hypothesis that nontransferable water rights cause technical inefficiency.
Looking at the estimation results for the other variables reveals the following. First, the coefficient on Dens is positive and significant, indicating that water suppliers are more efficient the more densely populated the area in which they operate. Second, the coefficient on Age is negative and significant, meaning that older water suppliers are less efficient than newer ones; one possible explanation is that older supplier may be operating with older infrastructure and equipment that is less efficient. Third, the coefficient on DCD is negative and significant, suggesting that soft budget constraints result in lower technical efficiency. Finally, the coefficients on CRD and IRD are also negative and significant, implying that less efficient water suppliers suffer from serious cash flow problems and depend on externally-raised capital for reinvestment.
Discussion
This section explores the counterfactual scenario that water rights are transferable among water suppliers. Under this counterfactual scenario, water suppliers are assumed to choose X-water withdrawals from water rights per population served-in order to maximize their technical efficiency subject to the level of demand they face, following the first-order condition (4) . 8 This improves their technical efficiency, resulting in a decrease in input for any given output level.
This decrease in input is used here to assess the cost incurred due to technical inefficiency resulting from the nontransferability of water rights by multiplying the price of water with lost output, where lost output is defined as the variation in water withdrawals from water rights multiplied by the amount of water Note. The column labels refer to the underlying specifications shown in Table 2 .
supplied. 9 Table 3 shows estimates of the costs of the technical inefficiency caused by nontransferable water rights. The column labels refer to the underlying specifications shown in Table 2 . The three specifications yield very similar results. The discussion below therefore focuses mainly on the results for column (3.1) .
Under the counterfactual scenario, the average technical efficiency is 0.9697, with the standard deviation being 0.0329 and the minimum value being 0.8730, indicating that the average ratio of improvement is 5.63%. This improvement in technical efficiency enables water suppliers to decrease their input for any given output level. The average lost output is 264, 775m 3 and the average water price per 10m 3 is 1, 470 yen, so that the average cost per water supplier due to the nontransferability of water rights is 365.9 million yen. Multiplying this by the number of water suppliers included in the calculations here, which is 1,263, yields a total cost of 462.1 billion yen due to inefficiency caused by the nontransferability of water rights. This amount is equivalent to 18.5% of the total operating revenue of Japanese water suppliers.
The implication of this finding is that the technical efficiency of Japan's water supply industry could be increased if water rights were transferable. This finding is in line with the Coase theorem and suggests that the present water rights regime in Japan prevents water being allocated according to the marginal willingness to pay for water. One possible solution therefore would be to allow water suppliers to trade in water rights. 10 Another possible solution would be for the government itself to reallocate water rights according to the marginal willingness to pay for water. In any case, the results here provide a strong case that the government should make possible the reallocation of water rights in order to raise the efficiency of the water supply industry.
Concluding Remarks
This study examined whether the Japanese scheme of nontransferable water rights results in technical inefficiency, employing the two-stage procedure proposed by Wilson (2000, 2007) . First, using data on 1,263 retail water suppliers in Japan for 2008, data envelopment analysis (DEA) was employed to obtain an index of technical efficiency. Second, a bootstrapped truncated regression model was specified to examine the determinants of the DEA efficiency index. The analysis revealed that the nontransferability of water rights leads to technical inefficiency of retail water suppliers. Furthermore, it was shown that the costs of this inefficiency amount to about 462 billion yen when compared with a counterfactual scenario in which water rights are reallocated in order to raise the efficiency of the water supply industry. This result suggests that the government should allow greater flexibility in the reallocation of water rightseither through the introduction of a trading scheme or by reallocating water 10 In fact, in many countries around the world, such trade in water rights is possible. Australia, Chile, China, South Africa, and the western United States all have tradable water rights regimes, and there are a number of studies that show that these improve the efficient use of water resources. Peterson rights itself based on water suppliers marginal willingness to pay-in order to increase efficiency.
This study focused strictly on the nontransferability of water rights and the implications this has for the technical efficiency of water utilities. In doing so, two important issues were not addressed. First, the regime of nontransferable water rights may result not only in technical inefficiency, but also in allocative inefficiency. If water suppliers regard water withdrawals as a fixed input, their cost functions should be similar to a short-run cost function: a constrained version of the cost function associated with variable water withdrawals. Therefore, allocative inefficiency is likely to arise unless the amount of fixed water withdrawals is equal to the amount of water withdrawals that would minimize the cost function associated with variable water withdrawals.
Second, the discussion here is restricted to transferable water rights for water for domestic use and, in addition, does not control for the climatic environment of watershed areas. The purpose of water rights regimes is to prevent the tragedy of the commons. In drought areas, not all water users have sufficient water rights. Therefore, the appropriate water rights regime needs to take into account the climatic environment and apply not only to water for domestic use but also to water for agricultural and industrial use.
